76th TNI Anniversary "Civilian Control Over Military is Weak, TNI Reformation Steps Down"

Today, October 5, 2021, the Indonesian National Army (TNI) commemorates its 76th anniversary. On this occasion, Imparsial would first like to wish Dirgahayu to the TNI, hopefully at the age of more than 3 (three) quarters, the TNI as a national defense tool is expected to be stronger, more professional, and able to carry out its duties in an accountable manner, respecting the democratic state system, and upholding high human rights.

We consider that a number of achievements have been recorded by the TNI, however, there are still a number of problems that require improvement. Therefore, we strongly encourage that the commemoration of the TNI's Anniversary is not enough to be commemorated ceremonially. It will be much more important and meaningful if it is used as a momentum to improve ourselves, considering that there is still a lot of homework to be done, especially regarding the delays in the implementation of a number of TNI reform agendas. It is wrong to say that the TNI reform process has been completed.

We consider the weak civilian control over the military to be one of the factors causing the delay in the TNI reform process. In fact, civilian control over the military, in this case the TNI, is an important condition for democratization and the realization of military professionalism. In our records, so far civilian control over the military is very weak and it can even be said that it tends not to work. This has resulted in the TNI reformation process not only stagnating, but experiencing setbacks in a number of aspects. There have been no positive achievements in the six years of Jokowi's administration. President Jokowi does not have the political will and courage to complete the TNI reform agenda.

The Ministry of Defense (Kemhan) which has control over the TNI, as confirmed in Law no. 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense, is actually also part of the existing problems. The problem is that the Ministry of Defense, which should exercise effective control over the TNI, is even affirmative and tries to give the TNI a place to exist in the civilian space and for domestic security. This can be seen from the efforts of the Ministry of Defense to continue the agenda of forming the National Defense Reserve Component (Komcad), although there are many criticisms and strong rejections from civil society circles against the plan to form it.

Likewise with the Parliament, its function of controlling and supervising the TNI has also been weakened. Although the parliament as a political institution has a supervisory and control function that can be carried out through the budget and legislation, this function is not carried out effectively and maximally in pushing the TNI reform agenda. In fact, parliament is an actor who has contributed to the creation of problematic laws, such as the Law on the Management of National Resources, which is used as a legal basis for the Ministry of Defense to establish the National Defense Reserve Component. Many allegations of irregularities in the administration of the defense sector have also escaped parliamentary scrutiny.

Furthermore, the following are a number of Imparsial notes related to the TNI reform agenda which are homework for the current government, namely:

First, the internal role of the military is getting stronger. One of the achievements of the implementation of the TNI reform in 1998 was the limitation on military involvement in the civilian sphere and in domestic security. As a national defense tool, the TNI is focused on preparing to face the threat of war from outside that threatens the sovereignty of the state as regulated in the Defense Law and the TNI Law. However, in recent years there has been a decline in these achievements where the military (TNI) has begun to be actively involved in overcoming domestic problems. Unfortunately, although the various forms of military involvement violated the TNI Law, in reality he was acquitted. There is no evaluation and correction from civil political authorities.

Menguatnya peran internal militer pada ranah sipil dan keamanan dalam negeri dapat dilihat dalam sejumlah praktik perbantuan militer yang dijalankan oleh TNI, seperti pelibatan TNI dalam mengatasi kelompok kriminal bersenjata di Papua, program cetak sawah, pengamanan stasiun, pengamanan kegiatan aksi unjuk rasa, mengatasi terorisme, penanggulangan pandemi Covid-19, dan lain sebagainya. Salah satu pola yang digunakan untuk melegitimasi peran internal tersebut adalah melalui Memorundum of Understanding (MoU) antara TNI dengan beberapa kementerian dan instansi. Berdasarkan catatan Imparsial, setidaknya terdapat 41 MoU antara TNI dan kementerian dan instansi lain telah dibentuk dalam kerangka pelaksanaan tugas perbantuan TNI (operasi militer selain perang). Dapat dikatakan, semua MoU tersebut bertentangan dengan Pasal ayat (3) UU TNI yang menyebutkan operasi militer selain perang hanya bisa dilakukan jika terdapat keputusan politik negara, dalam hal ini keputusan Presiden.

Kedua, belum dijalankannya reformasi sistem peradilan militer. Reformasi sistem peradilan militer melalui melalui perubahan UU No. 31 Tahun 1997 tentang Peradilan Militer merupakan salah satu mandat reformasi 1998 yang belum dijalankan. Padahal, dapat dikatakan bahwa agenda ini menjadi salah satu jantung dari reformasi TNI. Selama peradilan militer belum direformasi, selama itu pula proses reformasi TNI belum selesai. Selama ini, dengan UU ini, TNI memiliki rezim hukum sendiri dimana anggota TNI yang melakukan tindak pidana umum diadili di peradilan militer. Dalam praktiknya, peradilan militer menjadi sarana impunitas bagi anggota militer yang melakukan tindak pidana. Kalaupun ada hukuman terhadap anggota militer yang melakukan tindak pidana, seringkali sanksi yang dijatuhkan tidak maksimal.

Reformasi peradilan militer sesungguhnya adalah mandat dari UU No. 34/2004 tentang TNI. Pasal 65 Ayat (2) UU TNI menyebutkan bahwa “prajurit tunduk kepada kekuasaan peradilan militer dalam hal pelanggaran hukum pidana militer dan tunduk pada kekuasaan peradilan umum dalam hal pelanggaran hukum pidana umum yang diatur dengan undang-undang”. Selain itu, upaya mewujudkan reformasi peradilan militer merupakan sebuah kewajiban konstitusional yang harus dijalankan pemerintah dan parlemen. Upaya mengubah peradilan militer adalah suatu langkah konstitusional untuk menerapkan prinsip persamaan di hadapan hukum secara konsisten {Pasal 27 Ayat (1) juncto Pasal 28 Huruf d Ayat (1) UUD 1945}. Konsekuensi dari penerapan asas hukum tersebut adalah bahwa anggota militer yang melakukan tindak pidana umum perlu diadili dalam peradilan yang sama dengan warga negara lain yang melakukan tindak pidana umum, yakni melalui mekanisme peradilan umum.

Ketiga, restrukturisasi Komando Teritorial (Koter). Restrukturisasi Koter adalah salah satu agenda reformasi TNI yang diusung oleh gerakan mahasiswa dan demokratik lainnya pada awal reformasi 1998. Agenda ini disuarakan dalam satu paket dengan agenda penghapusan peran sosial-politik ABRI—sekarang TNI—yang dikenal sebagai dwifungsi ABRI. Dalam perjalanannya, meski peran politik ABRI/TNI telah dihapus, namun struktur Koter hingga kini tak kunjung juga direstrukturisasi dan masih dipertahankan. Bahkan, eksistensi Koter semakin mekar sejalan dengan pemekaran atau pembentukan provinsi dan kabupaten-kabupaten baru di Indonesia. Pemekaran terbaru terlihat dari pembentukan Komando Daerah Militer (Kodam) baru di Papua Barat yang tentunya akan diikuti oleh pembentukan struktur teritorial di bawahnya, seperti Komando Resort Militer (Korem) dan Komando Distrik Militer (Kodim).

Eksistensi Koter pada masa Orde Baru sangat terkait dengan dwifungsi ABRI. Koter yang dibentuk menyerupai hirarki dan struktur pemerintahan sipil, mulia dari pusat hingga daerah sampai di tingkat kecamatan, menjadi instrumen bagi ABRI menjalankan peran sosial-politiknya. Koter juga menjadi instrumen kontrol terhadap masyarakat, seperti digunakan untuk merepresi kelompok demokratik yang menentang rezim Soeharto. Pada perkembangannya, karakter dan watak penggunaan Koter juga tidak berubah pasca perubahan politik dari otoritarianisme ke demokrasi sejak tahun 1998. Koter kadangkala digunakan sebagai instrumen politik terutama di masa elektoral dan juga alat represi terhadap masyarakat.

Lebih jauh, restrukturisasi ini sejatinya juga telah diamantkan oleh UU No. 34 Tahun 2004 tentang TNI yang mensyaratkan kepada otoritas politik untuk melakukan restrukturisasi Koter yang penggelarannya tidak selalu mengikuti struktur administrasi pemerintahan. Restrukturisasi Koter juga bertujuan agar gelar kekuatan TNI (Postur TNI) dapat mendukung peran TNI sebagai alat pertahanan negara. Sebagai konsekuensi dari restrukturisasi Koter dan mempertimbangkan lingkungan strategis serta dinamika ancaman terkini adalah perlu segera dipikirkan dan dibentuk model Postur TNI yang menekankan pembangunan kesatuan gelar kekuatan trimatra secara terpadu dan lebih terintegrasi.

Keempat, kembalinya TNI di jabatan pemerintahan sipil. Reformasi politik paska 1998 mensyaratkan mensyaratkan penghapusan peran sosial politik TNI dan salah satu cerminnya adalah militer aktif tidak lagi menduduki jabatan politik seperti di DPR, Gubernur, Bupati, atau jabatan di kementerian dan lainnya. Sejak UU TNI disahkan, militer aktif hanya dapat menduduki jabatan-jabatan yang memiliki keterkaitan dengan fungsi pertahanan seperti Kementerian Pertahanan, Kemenkopulhukam, Sekmil Presiden, Intelijen Negara, Sandi Negara, Lemhanas, Dewan Pertahanan Nasional, Narkotika Nasional dan Mahkamah Agung (Pasal 47 ayat 2 UU TNI). Namun demikian, kini banyak anggota TNI aktif yang menduduki jabatan sipil seperti di Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana, Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral dan bahkan di Badan Usaha Milik Negara. Ombudsman RI mencatat sebanyak 27 anggota TNI aktif menjabat di BUMN. Bahkan, belakangan ini muncul kembali wacana untuk menempatkan anggota TNI aktif pada jabatan pemerintahan sipil, khususnya kepala daerah, akibat dari kegagalan pemerintah menangani pandemi yang berujung pada penundaan pelaksanaan pemilihan kepala daerah (Pilkada).

Secara prinsip, Pasal 39 UU TNI telah menegaskan bahwa “Prajurit dilarang terlibat dalam kegiatan politik praktis dan di dalam Pasal 47 Ayat 1 disebutkan bahwa “Prajurit hanya dapat menduduki jabatan sipil setelah mengundurkan diri atau pensiun dari dinas aktif keprajuritan”. Selain itu UU No. 5 Tahun 2014 tentang ASN mempertegas larangan penunjukan anggota TNI/Polri aktif menjadi Pj gubernur. Pasal 109 ayat 2 tentang Pengisian Jabatan Pimpinan Tinggi mengatur sebagai berikut: “Pimpinan Tinggi dapat diisi oleh prajurit TNI dan anggota Polri setelah mengundurkan diri dari dinas aktif apabila dibutuhkan, dan sesuai dengan kompetensi yang ditetapkan melalui proses secara terbuka dan kompetitif.

Lebih jauh Pasal 201 ayat (10) UU Pilkada mengatur, kekosongan jabatan gubernur harus diisi dengan Penjabat yang berasal dari jabatan pimpinan tinggi madya. Definisi pimpinan tinggi madya telah disebutkan dalam penjelasan Pasal 19 ayat (1) huruf b UU ASN yaitu: “Sekretaris jenderal kementerian, sekretaris utama, sekretaris jenderal kesekretariatan lembaga negara, sekretaris jenderal lembaga non-struktural, direktur jendral, deputi, inspektur jenderal, inspektur utama, kepala badan, staf ahli menteri, kepala sekretariat presiden, kepala sekretariat wakil presiden, sekretaris militer presiden, kepala sekretariat dewan pertimbangan presiden, sekretaris daerah provinsi, dan jabatan lain yang setara.” Dengan demikian anggota militer aktif yang ditunjuk menjadi PJ Gubernur memiliki potensi kuat bertentangan dengan aturan diatas.

Kelima, transparansi dan akuntabilitas dalam pengadaan Alutsista TNI rendah. Upaya modernisasi alutsista TNI untuk memperkuat pertahanan Indonesia merupakan langkah penting dan harus didukung. Sebagai komponen utama pertahanan negara, TNI perlu dilengkapi oleh alutsista militer yang lebih baik, kuat, dan modern untuk mendukung tugas pokok dan fungsinya dalam menjaga dan melindungi wilayah pertahanan Indonesia. Namun demikian, penting dicatat bahwa langkah tersebut harus dijalankan oleh pemerintah secara akuntabel, transparan, serta dengan mempertimbangkan ketersediaan anggaran dan kebutuhan TNI itu sendiri. Hal ini penting untuk memastikan pengadaan alutsista TNI mendukung upaya penguatan pertahanan negara Indonesia dan tidak memunculkan masalah baru di masa yang akan datang.

Dalam sejumlah pengadaan, misalnya, beberapa alutsista yang dibeli oleh pemerintah Indonesia berada di bawah standar dan kadang kala tidak sesuai dengan yang dibutuhkan. Selain itu, pengadaan melalui pembelian alutsista bekas juga menjadi persoalan. Padahal, jelas terdapat kecenderungan bahwa pengadaan alutsista bekas selalu memiliki potensi bermasalah yang lebih besar. Tidak hanya membebani anggaran untuk perawatan, tetapi juga beresiko terjadi kecelakaan yang mengancam keselamatan dan keamanan prajurit. Selain itu, pengadaan Alutsista kerap diwarnai keterlibatan pihak ketiga (broker). Dalam beberapa kasus, keterlibatan mereka kadang kala berimplikasi terhadap dugaan mark-up dalam pengadaan alutsista. Oleh karena itu, sudah seharusnya pengadaan alutsista di masa depan hendaknya tidak melibatkan pihak ketiga, tetapi langsung dilakukan dalam mekanisme government to government.

Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto's plan was also seen by the public as haphazard. Not without reason, Prabowo's purchase plan was not based on a clear study basis. It is known that until now the Ministry of Defense has not submitted a new defense white paper. This means that unlike previous years, the plan to purchase defense equipment is not based on a clear defense posture. In the midst of the unclear design, Prabowo actually asked for funding to procure a total of 1700 trillion IDR in 2021 which was later found to have come from foreign loans. The plan was very inappropriate considering that Indonesia was still in a state of concern due to the impact of the crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, which had not yet ended. In addition, the fund that must be spent before 2024 is very prone to corruption in the procurement of defense equipments.

In an effort to encourage transparency and accountability in the procurement of defense equipments, the government should encourage the role of independent supervisory institutions such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to supervise and investigate the use of defense budgets, or more specifically in the procurement. One of the efforts to encourage the role of the KPK, the first step that must be encouraged by the government and parliament is to reform the military judiciary through the revision of Law No. 31/1997. Even without waiting for the revision of the law, the KPK can be involved in monitoring and investigating allegations of irregularities in the procurement of defense equipment on the basis of the lex specialis derogat lex generalis principle.

Sixth, the persistence of impunity and the continuation of TNI violence against human rights defenders. TNI violence against the community and human rights defenders. Until now, violence perpetrated by TNI members against the civilians and human rights defenders still occurs in various regions. These cases of violence show that the reformation has not yet been completed, especially in an effort to break the militaristic culture inherited from the authoritarian New Order regime. The motives for the violent acts perpetrated by these members varied, ranging from personal problems, forms of solidarity with the wrong corps, land disputes with the community, involvement in evictions, and violence against journalists and human rights defenders.

The practice of state impunity was also demonstrated by civil authorities when President Jokowi appointed Brigadier General Dadang Hendrayudha and Brigadier General Yulius Selvanus respectively as Director General of Defense Potential of the Ministry of Defense and Head of the Defense Strategic Installation Agency of the Ministry of Defense. Previously, on December 6, 2019, Prabowo also appointed Chairawan Kadasryah Nusyirwan, who had been the Commander of the Mawar Team as Special Assistant to the Minister of Defense based on the Decree of the Minister of Defense Number: KEP/1869/M/XII/2019.

Although the names above have gone through the legal process at the Military High Court II Jakarta with the result that they were sentenced to 1 year 4 months and 20 months in prison for Brigadier Generals Dadang Hendrayudha and Yulius Selvanus, respectively, in April 1999 as Head of Units I and II of the Mawar Team, but the verdicts were not commensurate with the acts committed. The trial also failed to reveal all the actors involved. In addition, the public also did not know anything about the continuation of the case because the decision was not publicly published until it turned out that both of their military careers were still running until they became generals. In addition, human rights violators are given awards by the President. In 2021 the President gave the Bintang Jasa Utama award to Erico Guteres. The awarding of this award is problematic and inappropriate considering Erico's track record when he was still a militia involved in various human rights violations in the Timor-Timor conflict.

Instead of giving appropriate punishments to perpetrators of human rights violators, civil authorities have perpetuated the practice of impunity and at the same time betrayed their commitment to resolving human rights violations by giving perpetrators of human rights violators strategic positions in government.

Seventh, the welfare of TNI soldiers is still low and uneven. As a means of national defense, the TNI has the main task of protecting Indonesia's defense areas. This is not an easy job. To carry out its main task, the TNI requires the completeness of the main weapon system (defense equipment) that is adequate and the capacity of professional human resources.

With such a heavy and sacred task load, it is only natural that the professionalism of the TNI is supported by increasing the welfare of the soldiers. So far, the strengthening of human resources related to the welfare of TNI soldiers is still minimal. The limited number of official residences for members of the TNI is an example of a soldier's welfare problem.

In some cases, the welfare problems of TNI members have led them to seek other sources of income apart from their salaries. Although strengthening defense equipment is a necessity, providing welfare guarantees for soldiers is an obligation that must be fulfilled by the state, as emphasized in Article 49 in conjunction with Article 50 of Law No. 34/2004.

In addition to the agendas mentioned above, we also highlight the issue of replacing the TNI Commander in Chief which will be carried out in the near future. Although the change is the prerogative of the President, it is important for the president to observe and consider all inputs from various groups, including civil society. In principle, the replacement of the TNI Commander in Chief is not only a matter of changing figures, but will also determine the dynamics of the TNI's future journey, including democracy and human rights in Indonesia.

And thus, in the process of replacing the TNI Commander, we view that the President must use a normative and substantive approach rather than a political one. Based on a normative approach, the pattern of changing the TNI Commander in Chief prioritizes inter-dimensional rotation where the TNI Commander is held in rotation. The substantive approach is an approach that places the process of replacing the TNI Commander in Chief as a momentum in the regeneration process in the TNI. In this case, the President can ask for input from Komnas HAM, the KPK, academics, civil society and others to assess the quality and track record of candidates for TNI commanders. Substantively, the TNI Commander in the future must be free from corruption and allegations of involvement in cases of human rights violations. At this point, the President's credibility and commitment to human rights will be shown by who the future TNI Commander will be. Meanwhile, the political approach, which considers the elements of proximity and political interests, should be avoided. Because this will erode the professionalism of the TNI.

Jakarta, October 5th, 2021

Contact person:

  1. Gufron Mabruri (Direktur Imparsial/081213340612)
  2. Ardimanto (Wakil Direktur/081261944069)
  3. Husein Ahmad (Peneliti/081259668926)

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