



**Input for the Thematic Report on Reflections on the “Super Election” Year and its Global Impact on the Protection of the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association and for Ensuring Effective and Inclusive Public Participation for the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association**

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**A. The 2024 Super Elections: Declining Democracy and Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly and Association in Indonesia**

1. From 2023 to 2025, the “Super Election Year” featured major elections across Indonesia, Thailand, the United States, Mexico, and Taiwan.<sup>1</sup> As a country classified as *competitive authoritarianism*<sup>2</sup>, Indonesia saw heightened and widespread suppression of dissent, particularly targeting those who criticized election administration. Restrictions took various forms, including police reports filed against activists, intimidation of critics, and physical attacks aimed at silencing civil society. Amnesty International Indonesia documented systemic violations of freedoms of assembly and association during the 2024 elections,<sup>3</sup> highlighting:
  - a. Attacks on human rights defenders: At least 16 incidents affected 34 human rights defenders who spoke out against the government.
  - b. Restrictions on academic freedom: Scholars and academic communities raising electoral concerns faced intimidation and restrictions.
  - c. A surge in civil rights violations (2019-2023): Over four years, 363 cases of civil liberties violations were recorded, affecting 1,033 individuals. The year 2023 marked the peak, with 268 victims in just 12 months.
  - d. Intensified Acts of Repression Before Election Day:
    - 1) February 1, the day before the election: Immigration authorities detained a foreign national attending the Kamisan protest in Jakarta.

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<sup>1</sup> Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2025/call-inputs-reflections-super-election-year-and-its-global-impact-protection>

<sup>2</sup> Sana Jeffrey and Eve Warburton, “On The Edge of Competitive Authoritarianism”, *Bulletin of Indonesia Economic Studies*, 60:3, 283-304, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2024.2426571>. Freedom of Association Coalition has also submitted “Input for the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age for the Human Rights Council – June 2025”. Full report can be accessed on

<https://yappika-actionaid.or.id/id/publikasi/detail/186/input-for-the-special-rapporteur-on-freedom-of-opinion-and-expression-freedom-of-expression-and-elections-in-the-digital-age-for-the-human-rights-council-june-2025>

<sup>3</sup> Amnesty International Indonesia, “Pemilu Indonesia diwarnai oleh tingginya pembatasan”, retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.id/kabar-terbaru/siaran-pers/pemilu-indonesia-diwarnai-oleh-tingginya-pembatasan/02/2024/>



- 2) February 3: A student meeting titled “Election Fraud and President Jokowi's Impeachment” was forcibly disbanded near Trilogi University, Jakarta.
- 3) February 5: An academic declaration organized by professors at Bandung Institute of Technology, titled “Resisting Democratic Backsliding: The Shame of A Nation”, was disrupted.
- 4) February 7: Around 100 individuals surrounded the offices of YLBHI and KontraS, accusing the organizations of inciting calls for presidential impeachment.
- 5) February 11: Filmmakers behind the documentary *Dirty Vote*—Dhandy Laksono, Zainal Arifin Mochtar, Feri Amsari, and Bivitri Susanti—were reported to the police, accused of black campaign activities against specific candidates during the quiet period.
- 6) February 13: Students protesting election fraud outside the Constitutional Court were attacked by unidentified groups. The protest highlighted election irregularities and called for President Jokowi’s impeachment.

This wave of repression underscores how Indonesia’s 2024 elections were marred by systematic intimidation and silencing of dissent. Attacks on human rights defenders, academics, and activists were part of a deliberate effort to shrink democratic space and suppress freedom of expression. This phenomenon not only threatens the rights to peaceful assembly and association but also undermines the integrity of democracy—one that should ensure inclusive and meaningful public participation.

2. The Super Election has fostered greater collaboration among civil society organizations (CSOs) working on electoral issues across member countries of The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL).<sup>4</sup> Through shared election monitoring efforts, these organizations have exchanged support and insights, revealing notable shifts in democratic quality. The 2022 Philippine elections and 2024 Indonesian elections both demonstrated a troubling pattern: the dominance of election winners with ties to past human rights violations and entrenched political dynasties. Both elections were marked by interference in the independence of electoral bodies and the judiciary, political corruption through the misuse of social assistance funds and the mobilization of civil servants, widespread vote-buying, and campaign narratives—both in political discourse and on social media—that silenced or threatened critical voices.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> See <https://anfrel.org>

<sup>5</sup> ANFREL, “Interim Report of the ANFREL International Expert Election Observation Mission (IEEOM) to the 2024 Indonesia General Elections”, retrieved from <https://anfrel.org/interim-report-of-the-anfrel-international-expert-election-observation-mission-ieeom-to-the-2024-indonesia-general-elections/>

3. Indonesia's 2024 Super Election introduced unique challenges and complexities that severely impacted both the electoral process and its outcomes.<sup>6</sup> These complexities contributed to a high percentage of invalid ballots, an overwhelming workload for election officers—with some tragically dying from exhaustion—and local issues being overshadowed by overwhelming focus on national politics.<sup>7</sup> Another major concern was voter suppression, particularly in the administration of voting rights.<sup>8</sup> Stigma and a lack of understanding among election officials resulted in individuals with mental disabilities being excluded from voter lists or unable to cast their votes on election day.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, the requirement for an electronic ID card (KTP-el) disproportionately affected indigenous communities, many of whom did not meet the bureaucratic criteria, putting them at risk of losing their right to vote.<sup>10</sup>
4. At the end of 2024, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) named Indonesian President Joko Widodo (2014–2019 and 2019–2024) as a finalist for its “2024 Person of the Year in Organized Crime and Corruption” list. According to Tempo magazine, which represents OCCRP in Indonesia, Jokowi was nominated for dismantling the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and fostering a government that threatened civil liberties. In the 2024 election, he further cemented his political dynasty by influencing the Constitutional Court to change the eligibility rules for presidential and vice-presidential candidates, paving the way for his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run as Prabowo Subianto's vice-presidential candidate.<sup>11</sup>
5. Indonesia's 2024 Super Election provided the context for President Joko Widodo—who held power from 2014 to 2019 and 2019 to 2024—to extend his influence through his son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as vice president for the 2024–2029 term alongside President Prabowo Subianto. This consolidation of power shaped the 2024 regional elections (Pilkada) in ways that restricted the right to run for office. By forming an overwhelmingly large coalition in parliament called Koalisi

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<sup>6</sup> 2024 marks the first year that Indonesia has held all types of elections within a single year, with voting on February 14, 2024, to elect the president and vice president, members of the House of Representatives (DPR), provincial legislative councils (DPRD provinsi), and district/city legislative councils (DPRD kabupaten/kota), followed by voting on November 27, 2024, to elect provincial and district/city regional heads

<sup>7</sup> Perludem, “Surat Suara Tidak Sah Atau Suara Politik Golput?”, retrieved from <https://perludem.org/2021/06/30/surat-suara-tidak-sah-atau-suara-politik-golput-oleh-nurul-amalia-salabi/>

<sup>8</sup> Maharddhika and Nurul Amalia Sabali. *Gangguan terhadap Hak Memilih: Fenomena dan Upaya Penanggulangan*. (Jakarta: Perludem, 2021), retrieved from <http://perludem.org/2021/09/21/gangguan-terhadap-hak-memilih-fenomena-dan-upayapenanggulangan/>

<sup>9</sup> KPU DKI: ODGJ Bisa Dapatkan Hak Pilih di Pemilu tapi Ada Syarat, retrieved from <https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/dini-suciatiningrum/kpu-dki-odgj-bisa-dapatkan-hak-pilih-di-pemilu-2024-tapi-ada-syarat>

<sup>10</sup> Ajjid Fuad Muzaki, “Komnas HAM: Kelompok Marginal dan Rentan Kehilangan Hak Pilih Pemilu 2024”, retrieved from <https://rumahpemilu.org/komnas-ham-kelompok-marginal-dan-rentan-kehilangan-hak-pilih-pemilu-2024/>

<sup>11</sup> Tempo, “Akhirnya Jokowi sebagai Finalis Tokoh Korup 2024”, retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/prelude/rilis-occrp-jokowi-tokoh-terkorup-2024-1192913>



Indonesia Maju (KIM) Plus—a phenomenon described by Slater (2018) as party cartelization—Jokowi and Prabowo limited electoral competition. In the 2024 Jakarta gubernatorial election, all electability surveys placed Anies Baswedan and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama as the two politicians most favored by the public, yet neither was accepted by KIM Plus. More broadly, KIM Plus influenced many regional elections in 2024 to the extent that most districts had only two candidate pairs, with 35 regions reduced to a single uncontested candidate.

6. On September 16, 2023, during a national coordination meeting of Jokowi’s volunteer secretariat, President Joko Widodo stated that he was aware of the movements of all political parties thanks to comprehensive intelligence reports from the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Intelligence and Security Agency of the National Police (Baintelkam Polri), and the Strategic Intelligence Agency of the Indonesian Armed Forces (BAIS TNI). This statement indicated an abuse of power, as it suggested interference in institutions beyond the executive branch. Moreover, citing intelligence reports on the internal activities of political parties constituted a form of intimidation and coercion toward both political parties and civil society.<sup>12</sup> In principle, the use of intelligence against political parties is a serious threat to Indonesia’s democracy. Intelligence agencies should be focused on matters related to national security, not the direction of political parties or civil society,<sup>13</sup> let alone serving the political interests of the president. The politicization of intelligence in this context has severe consequences for democracy and poses a real threat to civil liberties in Indonesia.

## **B. Violations of the Right to Freedom of Assembly and Association in the 2024 National and Regional**

7. Violations of the right to freedom of assembly occurred during the #PeringatanDarurat (“Emergency Warning”) protests, which took place from August 22 to August 26, 2024. According to records compiled by the Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAuD)<sup>14</sup> through the National Violence Documentation Center, at least 380 individuals were arbitrarily arrested, 254 people suffered

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<sup>12</sup> Suara.com, “Imparsial: Jokowi sedang Cawe-cawe dan Intimidasi Parpol Lewat Pernyataan Punya Data Intelijen”, retrieved from <https://www.suara.com/news/2023/09/19/162614/imparsial-jokowi-sedang-cawe-cawe-dan-intimidasi-parpol-lewat-pernyataan-punya-data-intelijen>.

<sup>13</sup> Law No. 17 of 2011 on State Intelligence, Article 1, Paragraph (1) states: “Intelligence refers to knowledge, organizations, and activities related to policy formulation, national strategy, and decision-making based on the analysis of collected information and facts through work methods for detection and early warning to prevent, counter, and address any threats to national security.” Article 1, Paragraph (2) states: “State Intelligence refers to the organization of intelligence as an integral part of the national security system, authorized to carry out state intelligence functions and activities.”

<sup>14</sup> The Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAuD) is an alliance of several legal aid organizations and civil society groups that have provided legal assistance to protest participants and demonstrators since 2019.

injuries due to police brutality, and 9 individuals were named suspects by the Jakarta Metropolitan Police.<sup>15</sup>

8. Based on data from the National Violence Documentation Center compiled by TAUd, participants in the #PeringatanDarurat protests experienced several patterns of violence, including:
  - a. Acts of violence occurring in 13 regencies/cities across Indonesia, including Banda Aceh, Pekanbaru, Central Jakarta, Bandung, Purwokerto, Semarang, Kediri, Mataram, Banjarmasin, Samarinda, Tarakan, Palu, and Makassar;
  - b. Arrests accompanied by violence and the involvement of TNI personnel;
  - c. Acts of torture and other inhumane treatment;
  - d. Indiscriminate use of tear gas, which affected not only protesters but also uninvolved civilians and minors, as seen in Semarang on August 26, 2024;<sup>16</sup>
  - e. Short-term enforced disappearances due to a lack of access to information regarding detainees and obstruction of legal assistance by law enforcement officers; and
  - f. Digital attacks by personal accounts suspected to belong to security forces, one of which targeted public figure Andovi da Lopez, who participated in the #PeringatanDarurat protests in response to two Constitutional Court rulings. Andovi da Lopez was also questioned as a witness by the Criminal Investigation Agency (Bareskrim) of the National Police regarding disruptions to his WhatsApp account. However, to date, Bareskrim has not disclosed any updates on the progress of its investigation.<sup>17</sup>
9. In the context of the 2024 presidential election, several instances occurred where local governments revoked campaign venue permits for Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar, the presidential and vice-presidential candidates.<sup>18</sup> Some local governments justified these rejections or permit revocations by stating that the venues in question were government-owned facilities. This highlights issues of neutrality among local officials and state apparatus in the 2024 election race.

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<sup>15</sup> Tempo.co, “TAUD Sebut Ada 254 Korban Brutalitas Aparat di Demonstrasi Kawal Putusan MK”, retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/arsip/taud-sebut-ada-254-korban-brutalitas-aparat-di-demonstrasi-kawal-putusan-mk--7973>

<sup>16</sup> CNN Indonesia, “Anak-anak Kena Gas Air Mata di Semarang, Polisi Klaim Jalankan SOP”, retrieved from <https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20240827163608-12-1138150/anak-anak-kena-gas-air-mata-di-semarang-polisi-klaim-jalankan-sop>

<sup>17</sup> bantuanhukum.or.id, “Buntut Gangguan Pesan WhatsApp Ketika Aksi Peringatan Darurat, LBH Jakarta Mendampingi Pemeriksaan Andovi Sebagai Saksi”, retrieved from <https://bantuanhukum.or.id/buntut-gangguan-pesan-whatsapp-ketika-aksi-peringatan-darurat-lbh-jakarta-mendampingi-pemeriksaan-andovi-sebagai-saksi/>

<sup>18</sup> Kompas.com, “Izin Kampanye Sering Dicabut Pemda, Anies: Presiden, Mendagri, dan KPU Harus Tegur”, retrieved from [https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/30/06235921/izin-kampanye-sering-dicabut-pemda-anies-presiden-mendagri-dan-kpu-harus#google\\_vignette](https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2023/12/30/06235921/izin-kampanye-sering-dicabut-pemda-anies-presiden-mendagri-dan-kpu-harus#google_vignette)

10. Political polarization during the Jokowi era has further eroded social solidarity and restricted democratic space.<sup>19</sup> This has been exacerbated by systematic misinformation that distorts public opinion and strengthens elite control. Identity politics has been exploited to deepen social segregation and silence critical voices. At the same time, the lack of neutrality among state officials has further constrained civil liberties. Additionally, information manipulation has undermined electoral integrity and weakened political accountability.<sup>20</sup>
11. Several civil society organization (CSO) offices, including ICW, KontraS, Lokataru, and YLBHI-LBH Jakarta, were targeted by protests organized by a group calling itself the “Forum Masyarakat Pemuda Mahasiswa Indonesia Timur Cinta NKRI.” This same group had previously intimidated a student consolidation meeting at Trilogi University on February 3, 2024, and forcibly dispersed a student demonstration in front of the Constitutional Court on February 13, 2024. These actions are widely suspected to be linked to student and CSO activities criticizing the election process, particularly regarding its association with political dynasties and nepotism following Gibran Rakabuming’s candidacy for vice president and discussions surrounding the potential impeachment of President Joko Widodo.<sup>21</sup> The group exhibited a pro-government stance that appeared orchestrated by those in power and was believed to have political ties to the ruling elite. These incidents represent an attempt to silence freedom of expression and constitute direct attacks on human rights defenders and democracy itself.<sup>22</sup>
12. Several demonstrations were forcibly dispersed throughout the 2024 political year, particularly protests against the ratification of the Revised Regional Elections Law (Revisi UU Pilkada) in cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Semarang. Police used tear gas, water cannons, and batons to break up the crowds. Officers were also recorded beating and kicking protesters and journalists, while hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, some of whom were later named as suspects.<sup>23</sup> These arbitrary and violent actions constitute clear violations of the right to peaceful assembly for those seeking to express their concerns about the state of democracy and the simultaneous regional elections in Indonesia. According to monitoring

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<sup>19</sup> DetikNews, “Polarisasi Politik, Ruang Oposisi, dan Konsolidasi Kekuasaan”, retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-7568816/polarisasi-politik-ruang-oposisi-dan-konsolidasi-kekuasaan>

<sup>20</sup> Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, “Gangguan Informasi, Pemilu, dan Demokrasi: Panduan bagi Jurnalis dan Pemeriksa Fakta”, retrieved from [https://aji.or.id/system/files/2024-07/fixlayoutbukugangguaninformasipemiludandemokrasicompres1\\_4.pdf](https://aji.or.id/system/files/2024-07/fixlayoutbukugangguaninformasipemiludandemokrasicompres1_4.pdf)

<sup>21</sup> Savero Aristia Wienanto, “Gencar Suarakan Pemakzulan Jokowi, Kantor YLBHI-LBH Jakarta Sudah 3 Kali Didemo Sekelompok Massa,” retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/arsip/gencar-suarakan-pemakzulan-jokowi-kantor-ylbhi-lbh-jakarta-sudah-3-kali-didemo-sekelompok-massa--84251>

<sup>22</sup> Savero Aristia Wienanto, “Sederet Intimidasi terhadap Mereka yang Gaungkan Pemakzulan Jokowi,” retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/arsip/sederet-intimidasi-terhadap-mereka-yang-gaungkan-pemakzulan-jokowi-83798>,

<sup>23</sup> BBC.com, “Repetisi ‘brutalitas polisi’ dalam demonstrasi revisi UU Pilkada, mengapa terus berulang?”, retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cx2ldpkz9n8o>.

conducted by KontraS and the Advocacy Team for Democracy (TAuD), police officers' use of excessive force violated their own code of conduct as outlined in Police Regulation No. 1 of 2009 (Perkap 1/2009) on the Use of Force in Law Enforcement Actions. Furthermore, instances of violence by military personnel against protesters were documented, a practice that strays far from the core duties of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as stipulated in Law No. 34/2004 on the TNI. These incidents also indicate signs of military interference in civil affairs.<sup>24</sup> The continued lack of accountable oversight and a culture of impunity has allowed security forces to repeatedly commit acts of violence. The series of forced dispersals, violent crackdowns, and arbitrary arrests against protesters opposing the Revised Regional Elections Law were also confirmed by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), which conducted direct monitoring of these peaceful demonstrations across multiple locations.<sup>25</sup>

13. After the regional elections in Papua on December 5, 2024, dozens of police officers forcibly dispersed local residents and election monitors who were overseeing the vote counting process at the Yapen District Office.<sup>26</sup> The police attempted to remove the public and election witnesses/monitors by cutting the electricity and physically forcing them out of the room. This dispersal is suspected to have been an attempt to delay the counting process to allow for vote inflation.
14. During the lead-up to the 2024 elections, a series of crackdowns on peaceful protests and arbitrary acts of violence took place, including:
  - a. In Yogyakarta, on February 6, 2024, a discussion titled “Call for Consolidation: Inviting Lecturers, Students, and the Entire Academic Community of UNY. Awaken the People from a Democracy Celebration that Has Been Openly Tainted” was forcibly canceled by the UNY Student Executive Board (BEM UNY). The university administration refused to authorize the event and instructed that it be held outside the UNY campus. The event organizers also faced pressure not to proceed, and students participating in the protest were threatened with sanctions by one of the lecturers.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> KontraS, “Kekerasan Terhadap Masyarakat Sipil, Mahasiswa dan Jurnalis Pada Demonstrasi Menolak RUU Pilkada: Pertunjukan Kekerasan dan Kesewenang-wenangan Aparat”, retrieved from <https://kontras.org/media/siaranpers/kekerasan-terhadap-masyarakat-sipil-mahasiswa-dan-jurnalis-pada-demonstrasi-menolak-ruu-pilkada-pertunjukan-kekerasan-dan-kesewenang-wenangan-aparat>.

<sup>25</sup> Dwi Andayani, “Catatan Komnas HAM Soal Pembubaran Peserta Demo Tolak Revisi UU Pilkada”, Detiknews.com, retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-7504089/catatan-komnas-ham-soal-pembubaran-peserta-demo-tolak-revisi-uu-pilkada>.

<sup>26</sup> Tempo.co, “Cawe-cawe Penguasa dalam Pilkada 2024 Menghambat Reformasi TNI-Polri”, retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/pilkada-2024-reformasi-tni-polri-1178847>.

<sup>27</sup> Gatra, ”Diskusi Mahasiswa UNY Dibubarkan Rektorat, Guru Besar dan Dosen Emoh Sikapi Situasi Demokrasi”, retrieved from <https://www.gatra.com/news-592150-pemilu-2024-diskusi-mahasiswa-uny-dibubarkan-rektorat-guru-besar-dan-dosen-emoh-sikapi-situasi-demokrasi.html>.

- b. In Jakarta, on February 13, 2024, a day before the election, around 35 students from various universities who were demonstrating in front of the Constitutional Court were attacked by a dozen unidentified individuals. The protest focused on election fraud and called for Jokowi's impeachment. Around 15 unknown individuals used violence, including grabbing, pushing, seizing microphones, and even physically assaulting students in an attempt to break up the protest.<sup>28</sup> These cases further highlight the deteriorating state of human rights protections for citizens' freedoms of association and peaceful assembly, particularly in the context of the 2024 elections.<sup>29</sup>
15. The screenings of the film *Dirty Vote* in Gresik, East Java, and South Jakarta, DKI Jakarta, were canceled on February 12, 2024, on the grounds that they violated the election quiet period<sup>30</sup>. Additionally, a screening of the documentary *Eksil* in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, was canceled on February 22, 2024, due to the organizers not having obtained a public gathering permit from the Samarinda City Police<sup>31</sup>. The cinema unexpectedly required Aksi Kamisan Kaltim, the event organizer, to secure police approval for the screening. These bans on film screenings constitute repressive actions against freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and artistic freedom, further threatening the quality of democracy in Indonesia.

### C. The Police as a Political Instrument for Power Retention in Indonesia

16. One of the key factors behind Indonesia's democratic decline is the politicization of the National Police (Polri) under Joko Widodo's administration to maintain power. This is evident in three main aspects: 1) the appointment of police officers to strategic political and civilian positions, enabling government control and intervention; 2) police violence and repression targeting civil liberties, particularly against individuals and groups critical of the government; and 3) the broadening justification of police duties and functions, increasing the risk of abuse when the police are used as a political instrument of the regime<sup>32</sup>. Furthermore, a culture of

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<sup>28</sup> Tempo, "Gelar Demo Kecurangan Pemilu di MK, Puluhan Mahasiswa Dapat Intimidasi dan Kekerasan", retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/arsip/gelar-demo-kecurangan-pemilu-di-mk-puluhan-mahasiswa-dapat-intimidasi-dan-kekerasan-87555>

<sup>29</sup> ELSAM, "Pembubaran Diskusi: Kebebasan Sipil Makin Terancam, Negara Gagal Memberi Pelindungan", retrieved from <https://www.elsam.or.id/siaran-pers/pembubaran-diskusi--kebebasan-sipil-makin-terancam--negara-gagal-memberi-pelindungan>.

<sup>30</sup> Tempo, "Film *Dirty Vote* Mencuat: Dari Sambutan Hingga Larangan Nobar", retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/film-dirty-vote-mencuat-dari-sambutan-hingga-larangan-nobar-87768>

<sup>31</sup> BBC News Indonesia, "Film *Eksil* batal tayang di Samarinda karena 'tak ada izin keramaian' – 'Spirit Orde Baru masih bergentayangan'", retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/ce9557v5zvno>

<sup>32</sup> Sarah Niraini Siregar, Riady Raffiudin, and Firman Noor, "Democratic regression in Indonesia: Police and low-capacity democracy in Jokowi's administration (2014 - 2020)", *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Volume 26, Issue 2*, November 2022, p. 197 - 212, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.72129>



violence and abuse of power within the police remains deeply entrenched, as seen in 641 recorded incidents of police violence between July 2023 and June 2024, resulting in 745 injuries and 38 deaths.<sup>33</sup>

17. Findings from the Coalition for Freedom of Association and KontraS indicate that the police have been the dominant actor in violating the right to freedom of assembly, both through individual actions and as an institution. Monitoring by the Coalition for Freedom of Association, based on online media reports, recorded 289 incidents of violations and/or restrictions on freedom of assembly between July 2018 and July 2020. A total of 133 incidents occurred in 2018–2019, with the number increasing to 156 incidents in 2019–2020, marking a 14.28% rise. These violations and restrictions have affected at least 60,397 people, including 863 minors, 537 women, and 194 transgender individuals<sup>34</sup>. Additionally, KontraS (2024) documented 167 incidents of violations of freedom of assembly between 2021 and 2023, resulting in 712 arrests, 125 injuries, and 4 deaths.
18. The Coalition for Freedom of Association has highlighted the role of the police in restricting civil society's freedom of assembly in Indonesia. However, the exercise of this right is often hindered by repressive limitations. Additionally, under the administrative procedures of the Intelligence and Security Agency of the National Police, individuals or groups intending to hold public gatherings or express their opinions in public spaces are required to sign a statement of responsibility for the event, yet they never receive an official Notification Receipt Letter (STTP), which serves as police acknowledgment of the protest notice.<sup>35</sup>
19. The misuse of the police institution in the 2024 general and regional elections represents a clear violation of civil space.<sup>36</sup> Findings from Themis Indonesia indicate suspected police involvement in securing victories for certain regional head candidates in Banten, Central Java, and DKI Jakarta.<sup>37</sup> The alleged deployment of police resources included: 1) mobilizing logistical support for specific candidates;

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<sup>33</sup> KontraS, "Laporan Hari Bhayangkara 2024: Reformasi Polisi Tinggal Ilusi", Juni 2024, retrieved from <https://kontras.org/laporan/laporan-hari-bhayangkara-2024-reformasi-polisi-tinggal-ilusi>

<sup>34</sup> YAPPIKA-ActionAid, ELSAM, dan IMPARSIAL, "Inputs of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association for his report - The 76th session of the General Assembly", retrieved from <https://yappika-actionaid.or.id/id/publikasi/detail/103/input-unsr-foaa-submission-to-76th-ga-session-report>

<sup>35</sup> Freedom of Association Coalition, "Still Far from Adequately Protected: The Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights in Indonesia", retrieved from [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/DownloadDraft.aspx?key=1cJsGKycgclvjImzvK3XZEzsfuiCu/pMnuamRz+pcCzyjguJgq17RkoFmvNzP+nebjZHK8tSvreALuZ8xKk/4w==](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/DownloadDraft.aspx?key=1cJsGKycgclvjImzvK3XZEzsfuiCu/pMnuamRz+pcCzyjguJgq17RkoFmvNzP+nebjZHK8tSvreALuZ8xKk/4w==)

<sup>36</sup> See Freedom of Association Coalition, "Input for the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression: Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age for the Human Rights Council – June 2025", retrieved from

<https://yappika-actionaid.or.id/id/publikasi/detail/186/input-for-the-special-rapporteur-on-freedom-of-opinion-and-expression-freedom-of-expression-and-elections-in-the-digital-age-for-the-human-rights-council-june-2025>

<sup>37</sup> Kompas.com, "Themis Indonesia Temukan Keterlibatan Polri pada Pilkada Banten dan Jateng", retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2024/12/12/16581221/themis-indonesia-temukan-keterlibatan-polri-pada-pilkada-banten-dan-jateng>.



2) directing electoral efforts from the provincial to the village level; and 3) pressuring village heads by threatening legal action.<sup>38</sup> The misuse of the police force in the 2024 elections under President Joko Widodo has also stalled police reform, even leading to its regression. This setback threatens civil liberties, as the police are increasingly unable to function professionally as law enforcers, safeguard human rights, and uphold democratic freedoms.

#### **D. Limited Civil Society Involvement in Electoral Policy-Making in Indonesia**

20. On August 21, 2024, following the Constitutional Court's ruling on the threshold for regional head candidates in the Regional Elections Law (UU Pilkada), the Legislative Body of the House of Representatives (Baleg DPR RI) decided to maintain the 20 percent parliamentary seat threshold for candidacy—effectively overriding the Constitutional Court's decision through a limited revision of the law. The deliberation process was conducted abruptly, without meaningful public participation, and even raised concerns of constitutional defiance. However, the passage of this revision was ultimately cancelled following widespread demonstrations across multiple cities in Indonesia, where protesters demanded that the DPR RI and the government uphold the Constitutional Court's ruling on the 2024 regional election candidacy requirements.<sup>39</sup>
21. On April 18, 2023, the General Elections Commission (KPU) enacted KPU Regulation No. 10 of 2023,<sup>40</sup> which was seen as a setback for democracy as it weakened the enforcement of the 30 percent women's representation quota in legislative candidacy. The National Commission on Violence Against Women (Komnas Perempuan) criticized the regulation for diluting affirmative policies aimed at ensuring women's political representation. By rounding down the calculation of the 30 percent quota for female candidates, the regulation further restricted women's political space, making it even more difficult to meet the required quota and disadvantaging female legislative candidates. Ensuring women's political representation is a crucial step toward gender equality, and affirmative action policies are not discriminatory but rather a corrective measure against long-standing systemic discrimination. Komnas Perempuan and civil society coalitions have urged the KPU to revise the regulation immediately. Additionally, the KPU and the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) must monitor the impact of this

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<sup>38</sup> Tempo, "Tangan Jokowi dan Polisi di Pilkada 2024", retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/cawe-cawe-polisi-di-pilkada-1166153>.

<sup>39</sup> Tempo, "Jalan Keras Kawal Putusan MK hingga Gagalkan DPR Sahkan Revisi UU Pilkada, Berikut Kronologinya", retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/jalan-keras-kawal-putusan-mk-hingga-gagalkan-dpr-sahkan-revisi-uu-pilkada-berikut-kronologinya-15410>

<sup>40</sup> The provision that undermines women's representation is Article 8, Paragraph (2) of General Elections Commission Regulation No. 10 of 2023 on the nomination of candidates for the House of Representatives (DPR), Provincial Regional Councils (DPRD Provinsi), and District/City Regional Councils (DPRD Kabupaten/Kota)



policy on women's political rights, which has already been reported as a violation of those rights.<sup>41</sup>

22. During the 2024 elections, the General Elections Commission (KPU) restricted access to information related to the background of legislative candidates. As of December 2023, 30 percent of candidate biographies were not published in the Final Candidate List for the Legislative Elections.<sup>42</sup> KPU justified this decision by citing compliance with the Public Information Disclosure Law and the Personal Data Protection Law, arguing that certain details needed to be withheld as they contained personal confidential data. The Civil Society Coalition for Information Transparency argued that a strict consequence test should be applied to determine which information is withheld, and that both the process and results of this assessment should be disclosed to the public.<sup>43</sup> This policy risks undermining electoral transparency and creating opportunities for misuse. It also demonstrates the KPU's failure to accommodate meaningful public participation in ensuring that the 2024 elections uphold the principles of direct, public, free, confidential, honest, and fair elections.

#### **E. Restrictions on Freedom of Assembly and Association for Vulnerable Groups in the 2024 General and Regional Elections**

23. The top-down development approach of "Jokowism" and the entrenchment of political dynasties through the use of power have damaged democratic structures and exemplify the *politics of marginalization* toward vulnerable groups. This marginalization restricts public access to resources, particularly in regions where land and other natural resources are deemed valuable and repurposed by the government for development projects, especially under the National Strategic Projects (PSN).<sup>44</sup> The Indonesian Civil Society Coalition for International Human Rights Advocacy has also documented two key forms of repression during Joko Widodo's administration that reflect its authoritarian tendencies: sectarian populist

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<sup>41</sup> Komnas Perempuan, "Siaran Pers Komnas Perempuan: Peraturan KPU No. 10 Tahun 2023 Mereduksi Kebijakan Afirmasi dan Tidak Mendorong Tata Pemerintahan Bebas dari Kekerasan terhadap Perempuan", retrieved from

<https://komnasperempuan.go.id/siaran-pers-detail/siaran-pers-komnas-perempuan-peraturan-kpu-no-10-tahun-2023-mereduksi-kebijakan-afirmasi-dan-tidak-mendorong-tata-pemerintahan-bebas-dari-kekerasan-terhadap-perempuan>; Komnas Perempuan, "Masyarakat Sipil Anggap KPU Menunda-nunda Revisi Aturan soal Perhitungan Keterwakilan Perempuan", retrieved from <https://www.kompas.id/baca/polhuk/2023/09/11/masyarakat-sipil-anggap-kpu-menunda-nunda-revisi-aturan-soal-perhitungan-keterwakilan-perempuan>.

<sup>42</sup> BBC News Indonesia, "Caleg tolak publikasikan daftar riwayat hidup, apa untung ruginya bagi pemilih?", retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/c5103k3kejeo>

<sup>43</sup> The Civil Society Coalition for Information Transparency (Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Keterbukaan Informasi), "Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Menuntut Keterbukaan Informasi ke KPU terkait Pengecualian Informasi Riwayat Hidup Calon Legislatif", retrieved from

<https://aji.or.id/informasi/koalisi-masyarakat-sipil-menuntut-keterbukaan-informasi-ke-kpu-terkait-engecualian>

<sup>44</sup> Amanda tho Seeth, Jafar Suryomenggolo, "Politics of Marginalisation in Indonesia: The Jokowi Era", IQAS Vol. 55/2024 II, pp. 137–153, <https://doi.org/10.11588/iqas.2024.2.27205>

repression and repression under the guise of development.<sup>45</sup> The latter, known as repressive developmentalism, has been used to silence those who oppose projects framed as serving the national interest, particularly infrastructure development. Democratic rights have been sidelined in the name of strategic national interests, as seen in the repression and violence that have occurred in Rempang, Wadas, IKN, Papua, and other regions across Indonesia.<sup>46</sup> This demonstrates that the Joko Widodo administration has not only failed to strike a balance between economic development and human rights protection but has also indisputably worsened civil liberties and further violated the rights of victims of human rights abuses.

24. In addition to gender-insensitive regulations such as KPU Regulation No. 10 of 2023, which weakens affirmative action for women's representation, deeper structural barriers persist, including entrenched patriarchy, a dominant masculine political culture, and imbalanced power dynamics.<sup>47</sup> Financial support also remains a major hurdle for female candidates, further reinforcing voter bias that favors male candidates over women. The Coalition for Women's Representation (KMPKP) observed that in the 2024 elections, women continued to face political and gender-based violence, with rising incidents of harassment, intimidation, and physical and sexual violence in both public spaces and online platforms.<sup>48</sup> These conditions have further constrained the political participation of women and other marginalized groups.
25. Indications of electoral fraud were reported among overseas voters. The General Elections Commission (KPU) admitted to negligence and procedural errors in the early delivery of 62,552 ballots to Taipei, Taiwan, ahead of the scheduled timeline. As a response, the KPU declared these ballots "invalid".<sup>49</sup> This incident has further eroded public trust and raised doubts about the professionalism and competence of election organizers.

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<sup>45</sup> Indonesia's NGO Coalition for Civil and Political Rights Advocacy, "A Joint Shadow Report: Repressive Developmentalism and Sectarian Populism in Indonesia", Related to The Indonesian Government's Report to the UN Human Rights Committee on Civil and Political Rights - 75th Session of The Human Rights Committee on Civil and Political Rights, retrieved from [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCESCR%2FCS.S%2FIDN%2F57178&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2FCESCR%2FCS.S%2FIDN%2F57178&Lang=en).

<sup>46</sup> ELSAM, "Siaran Pers Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Indonesia untuk Advokasi HAM Internasional: Sisi Gelap Pembangunan Era Jokowi Dalam Dua Modus Represi: Populisme Sektarian Dan Dalih Pembangunan", retrieved from <https://www.elsam.or.id/siaran-pers/sisi-gelap-pembangunan-era-jokowi-dalam-dua-modus-represi--populisme-sektarian-dan-dalih-pembangunan>.

<sup>47</sup> Voice of America (VOA), "Mendorong Keterwakilan Perempuan di Pemilu 2024", retrieved from <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/mendorong-keterwakilan-perempuan-di-pemilu-2024/6715882.html>; Rumah Pemilu, "Pemilu 2024: Perempuan Masih Alami Kekerasan dalam Politik", retrieved from <https://rumahpemilu.org/pemilu-2024-perempuan-masih-alami-kekerasan-dalam-politik/>

<sup>48</sup> Rumah Pemilu, "Pemilu 2024: Perempuan Masih Alami Kekerasan dalam Politik", retrieved from <https://rumahpemilu.org/pemilu-2024-perempuan-masih-alami-kekerasan-dalam-politik/>

<sup>49</sup> BBC News Indonesia, "Insiden puluhan ribu surat suara Pemilu 2024 dikirim ke Taiwan 'di luar jadwal' - 'Harus diselidiki, bisa memicu dugaan KPU lakukan kecurangan'", retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cpv6k2x70k6o>

26. The Overseas Voter Division of the Labor Party (Partai Buruh) stated that approximately 2.6 million migrant workers were at risk of losing their voting rights due to unverified voter data from the General Elections Commission (KPU). The lack of transparency and limited access to information left many voters unregistered, reflecting a disregard for the political rights of migrant workers. It also highlights the failure of election organizers to ensure the participation of Indonesian citizens abroad. Weak verification processes have created opportunities for fraud and vote manipulation, further marginalizing migrant workers' voting rights amid ongoing democratic uncertainty.<sup>50</sup>
27. Indigenous communities faced structural barriers in the 2024 elections due to difficulties in obtaining electronic ID cards (KTP-el). One major issue is the inflexibility of residency records, which fail to accommodate those who move frequently, live in remote areas, or reside in forested regions. Additionally, discrimination and land conflicts have forced many to leave their territories, as seen in cases like Rempang and Wadas. The lack of KTP-el has further deepened their marginalization, particularly for those who practice faiths outside the six state-recognized religions. Voter registration processes that fail to account for the realities of Indigenous communities risk systematically stripping them of their political rights. The General Elections Commission (KPU) must implement affirmative policies to ensure Indigenous peoples are no longer excluded from democratic participation.<sup>51</sup>
28. At least 400 residents of the Al-Fajar Berseri Mental Rehabilitation Center in Bekasi lost their voting rights after being excluded from the final voter list. The Bekasi Regency General Elections Commission (KPU) remained passive, failing to register the residents or provide education on their voting rights, despite the fact that individuals with mental disabilities are legally entitled to vote. Similar cases occurred in several other rehabilitation centers, including those in Banten, West Java, Central Java, East Java, and the Special Region of Yogyakarta. The stigma of being deemed “legally incompetent” remains the primary barrier to fulfilling the political rights of individuals with mental disabilities. The state should be ensuring electoral accessibility for this group, rather than neglecting their constitutional rights.<sup>52</sup>
29. In the lead-up to the 2024 elections, anti-LGBT sentiment surged and was weaponized as a political tool to gain support from groups opposing LGBT rights. This regression was further exacerbated by the introduction of discriminatory anti-LGBT regulations at the regional level, directly targeting the existence and rights of LGBT individuals. Through these policies, both the national and local

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<sup>50</sup> Jaring.id, “Surut Suara Pemilih Luar Negeri”, diakses dari <https://jaring.id/surut-suara-pemilih-luar-negeri/>

<sup>51</sup> BaKTINews, “Problema Pendataan Masyarakat Adat sebagai Pemilih Dalam Pemilu”, retrieved from <https://baktinews.bakti.or.id/artikel/problema-pendataan-masyarakat-adat-sebagai-pemilih-dalam-pemilu>

<sup>52</sup> Rumah Pemilu, “Diskriminasi Hak Pilih Disabilitas Mental di Pusat Rehabilitasi”, retrieved from <https://rumahpemilu.org/diskriminasi-hak-pilih-disabilitas-mental-di-pusat-rehabilitasi/>

governments legitimized this sentiment,<sup>53</sup> effectively normalizing persecution against the LGBT community and stripping it of recognition as a human rights violation. This reflects a blatant disregard for fundamental human rights principles and the inclusivity that democracy should uphold. Such an approach not only undermines the values of justice but also deepens structural discrimination against the LGBT community.

## F. Civil Society Movements in Protecting Freedom of Assembly and Association in the 2024 General and Regional Elections in Indonesia

30. During the 2024 electoral race, a member of the House of Representatives (DPR) Commission II from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) proposed the legalization of vote-buying. Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) condemned the proposal as highly inappropriate and lacking integrity.<sup>54</sup> ICW also launched campaigns urging the public to monitor and report instances of vote-buying.<sup>55</sup> In various regions, including Medan, the “Young People’s Movement Against Vote-Buying” encouraged younger generations to reject the practice in order to safeguard the integrity of democracy.<sup>56</sup> Vote-buying is widely regarded as a serious threat that undermines both electoral quality and leadership standards.
31. The Green Democratic movement campaigned to encourage the public to elect leaders capable of managing natural resources responsibly to prevent widespread environmental damage. The coalition also urged citizens to reject vote-buying practices and actively monitor election organizers to ensure a clean and fair electoral process.<sup>57</sup>
32. The #PeringatanDarurat (Emergency Warning) movement was organized to oppose the revision of the Regional Elections Law (UU Pilkada) and to safeguard two Constitutional Court rulings, Ruling No. 60/PUU-XXII/2024 and Ruling No. 70/PUU-XXII/2024. It became a well-organized and forceful mobilization against elite political interests that threaten democracy.<sup>58</sup> The revision of the Regional

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<sup>53</sup> BBC News Indonesia, “Kami tidak akan lagi mau termakan janji palsu politisi – Suara kelompok LGBT di tengah sentimen anti-LGBT demi dongkrak suara di Pemilu 2024”, retrieved from <https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/articles/cw4k4yd5pnlo>

<sup>54</sup> Tempo, “Ramai-ramai Tolak Usulan Money Politics Dilegalkan”, retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/ramai-ramai-tolak-usulan-money-politics-dilegalkan-saat-pemilu-58719>.

<sup>55</sup> ANTARA Kantor Berita Indonesia, “LSM kampanye tolak praktik politik uang”, retrieved from <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/420533/lsm-kampanye-tolak-praktik-politik-uang>

<sup>56</sup> Kemitraan, “Deklarasi Gerakan Orang Muda Anti-Politik Uang di Medan”, retrieved from <https://www.kemitraan.or.id/publication/deklarasi-gerakan-orang-muda-anti-politik-uang-di-medan/>

<sup>57</sup> Indonews.id, “Tolak Politik Uang, Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil: Tak Sebanding dengan Kerusakan Lingkungan dan Ekonomi Daerah”, retrieved from <https://indonews.id/artikel/340519/Tolak-Politik-Uang-Koalisi-Masyarakat-Sipil-Tak-Sebanding-dengan-Kerusakan-Lingkungan-dan-Ekonomi-Daerah/>

<sup>58</sup> Tempo.co, “Dua Putusan MK Jadi Sumbu Pergerakan Aksi Massa dan Viral Peringatan Darurat”, retrieved from <https://www.tempo.co/politik/dua-putusan-mk-jadi-sumbu-pergerakan-aksi-massa-dan-viral-peringatan-darurat-16329>

Elections Law represents a dangerous maneuver that blatantly undermines democratic principles and violates the constitution. This move is not merely a regulatory change but a concealed agenda to entrench the ruling regime's power, further exacerbating authoritarianism in Indonesia.<sup>59</sup> Civil society movements across various cities, including artists and cultural workers, strongly rejected this hijacking of democracy.<sup>60</sup> The wave of protests and the democracy emergency campaign, which also gained momentum on social media, became a powerful demonstration of collective public resistance that ultimately led to the failure of the proposed revision of the Regional Elections Law.<sup>61</sup>

33. The Constitutional Court ultimately ruled to eliminate the presidential and vice-presidential candidacy threshold. Previously, this restriction on political rights had been challenged 32 times. The latest petition accepted by the court was filed by students from the Faculty of Sharia and Law at Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University in the Special Region of Yogyakarta. Through Ruling No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024, the Constitutional Court found that the provisions outlined in Article 222 of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections were in conflict with the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and, therefore, had no binding legal force. With this ruling, all political parties participating in elections will be able to nominate presidential and vice-presidential candidates starting from the 2029 election. The previous requirement that a party or coalition must hold 20% of parliamentary seats or secure 25% of the vote in the previous election has been deemed unconstitutional. The presidential candidacy threshold is fundamentally absent from the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, both in its wording and phrasing, and is not supported by its original intent.<sup>62</sup>

## G. Recommendations

34. The UN Human Rights Council should urge all member states, including the Indonesian government, to ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT) to eliminate all forms of torture and violence, including within the context of elections.

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<sup>59</sup> The Indonesian Association for Legal Aid and Human Rights (PBHI), ‘‘Press Release Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia (PBHI, Revisi UU Pilkada: Pembajakan Konstitusi dan Pengokohan Dinasti Jokowi’’, retrieved from <https://pbhi.or.id/revisi-uu-pilkada-pembajakan-konstitusi-dan-pengokohan-dinasti-jokowi/>

<sup>60</sup> BBC Indonesia, ‘‘Ini Bukan Negara Milik Keluarga Tertentu’’, diakses dari [https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/extra/gn1j45vx6z/protes\\_ruu\\_pilkada](https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/extra/gn1j45vx6z/protes_ruu_pilkada)

<sup>61</sup> Gadjah Mada University, ‘‘Revisi UU Pilkada Batal, Buah Keberhasilan Aksi Protes Mahasiswa’’, retrieved from <https://ugm.ac.id/id/berita/revisi-uu-pilkada-batal-buah-keberhasilan-aksi-protes-mahasiswa/>

<sup>62</sup> Rumah Pemilu, ‘‘Perludem: Penghapusan Presidential Threshold Perkuat Kesetaraan Politik’’, retrieved from <https://rumahpemilu.org/perludem-penghapusan-presidential-threshold-perkuat-kesetaraan-politik/>; Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi (Perludem), ‘‘MK Hapus Presidential Threshold, Perludem: Fenomenal, Sudah Dinanti Cukup Panjang’’, retrieved from <https://perludem.org/2025/01/03/mk-hapus-presidential-threshold-perludem-fenomenal-sudah-dinanti-cukup-panjang/>



35. The UN Human Rights Council should encourage the Indonesian government to revise the Election Law to: i) guarantee freedom in the formation of political parties, as well as the nomination of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, legislative members, and regional heads; ii) establish protections for vulnerable groups throughout the electoral process, ensure inclusive elections, and align regulations with the Law on Sexual Violence Crimes to guarantee safety and freedom from all forms of sexual violence.
36. The UN Human Rights Council should call on the Indonesian government to conduct serious oversight and evaluation of the police institution to advance comprehensive police reform. This includes revoking internal police regulations and administrative policies that restrict the right to assemble and express opinions in public.
37. The UN Human Rights Council should ensure that all electoral violations and criminal offenses committed by state officials—including civil servants, military personnel, police officers, and election organizers—are not merely subject to ethical and administrative sanctions but are also prosecuted in accordance with applicable laws (*pro justicia*).
38. The UN Human Rights Council should urge the Indonesian government to conduct oversight and evaluation of violations committed by both state and non-state actors to strengthen protections for freedom of assembly and association in Indonesia, particularly in the context of elections.
39. The UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association should pay particular attention to the situation in Indonesia by issuing an official statement to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the condition of these rights. Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur should initiate urgent action by conducting an official visit to Indonesia to assess the state of freedom of assembly and association, including ensuring accountability for violations committed by security forces, including the military, police, and intelligence agencies.
40. Civil society organizations and movements at the local, national, and international levels, together with the general public, should continue to support and strengthen advocacy efforts for the protection of freedom of assembly and association, particularly in ensuring the rights of vulnerable groups in the electoral process.

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<sup>i</sup> **The Peoples Participation, Initiative and Partnerships Strengthening Foundation (YAPPIKA - a member of ActionAid International)** is a non-profit organization that has been standing and working together with some communities in Indonesia since 1991 to encourage government policies to improve public services in between the fields of education and health and advocate for a better enabling environment for civil society. Since 2010, the YAA Indonesia has been the secretariat of the Freedom of Association Coalition focused on enabling a conducive environment for CSOs in Indonesia. YAPPIKA Website: <http://yappika-actionaid.or.id/>

<sup>ii</sup> **The Center for Indonesian Law and Policy Studies (Pusat Studi Hukum dan Kebijakan Indonesia, PSHK)** is a research and advocacy institution for legal reform, with visions of the establishment of socially responsible law or towards socially responsible lawmaking. Established in 1998, PSHK works focus on legislation and justice.





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In the field of legislation, PSHK carries out three main activities, namely legislative monitoring, legislative assessment, and legislative drafting. Meanwhile, In the field of justice. PSHK is consistently involved in the reform agenda at the Indonesian Supreme Court. Enhance legal understanding of policy-making processes through evidence-based studies and active participation in public discourse is the main aims of PSHK. PSHK Website: <https://pshk.or.id/>

<sup>iii</sup> **The Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH Jakarta)** is an institution that provides structural legal assistance to poor, legally illiterate and oppressed communities in the context of upholding the rule of law, democracy and human rights based in Jakarta. LBH Jakarta Website: <https://bantuanhukum.or.id/>

<sup>iv</sup> **The Indonesian Human Rights Monitor (IMPARSIAL)** was established by 18 workers of human rights in Indonesia, among others, Todung Mulya Lubis, Karlina Leksono, M.M. Billah, Wardah Hafidz, Hendardi, Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, [the late] Ade Rostina Sitompul, Robertus Robet, Binny Buchory, Kamala Chandrakirana, [the late] H.S. Dillon, [the late] Munir, Rachland Nashidik, Rusdi Marpaung, Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Nezar Patria, Amiruddin, and Poengky Indarti. The founders share the same concern: state power with tendency of its repressive practices show a stronger tendency in Indonesia today. Right opposite, society institutions working in the field of promotion and protection of human rights also show lower trend. IMPARSIAL Website: [www.imparsial.org](http://www.imparsial.org)

<sup>v</sup> **The Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy (ELSAM)** is a human rights organization that has been established in Jakarta, since August 1993. It aims to participate in efforts to develop, promote and protect civil and political rights as well as human rights in general - as mandated by the 1945 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ELSAM currently has three main activities, which consist of: (1) mainstreaming human rights in policy making; (2) study and production of human rights knowledge to support policy advocacy; and (3) Human Rights Education. ELSAM website: <https://elsam.or.id/>

<sup>vi</sup> **Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)** is an organization that conducts research, advocacy, monitoring, education, and training on elections and democracy for policy makers, organizers, participants, and voters. Perludem has a vision of realizing a democratic state and holding elections that are able to accommodate people's freedom and maintain people's sovereignty. Perludem strengthens democratic values and their implementation on a national, regional, and global scale, including by becoming a member of the Asian Network for Free Election (ANFREL), then with the achievement of the Silver Award from The Third Annual Open Government Awards (France, 2016), together with rumahpemilu.org being nominated in "The Bobs-Best of Online Activism" DW's online activism contest (Germany, 2016). Perludem website: <https://perludem.org>